This paper examines government policies aimed at rescuing banks from the effects of the financial crisis of [2008][2009]. Governments responded to the crisis by guaranteeing bank assets and liabilities and by injecting fresh capital into troubled institutions. We employ event study methodology to estimate the benefits of government interventions on banks. Announcements directed at the banking system as a whole were associated with positive cumulative abnormal returns whereas announcements directed at specific banks with negative ones. The effects of foreign general announcements spilled over across different areas and were perceived by home-country banks as subsidies boosting the competitive advantage of foreign banks. Specific announcements produced effects that were consistent with other banks being crowded out for government resources. Multiple specific announcements exacerbated the extent of banks' moral hazard. Results were sensitive to the information environment. Findings are consistent with the hypothesis that individual institutions were reluctant to seek public assistance.
INTRODUCTION
The financial earthquake of the subprime crisis, starting in 2007 and further developing in the subsequent two years, generated a tsunami of public interventions into banking systems. In this paper, we examine government policies aimed at rescuing banks from the effects of this crisis. To delimit the scope of the analysis, we concentrate on the fiscal side of interventions and ignore, by design, the monetary policy reaction to the crisis (in essence, we ignore inflation as a possible exit strategy).
The subprime crisis fits many of the characteristics of the credit-boom-and-bust-cycle hypothesis, discussed, among others, by Mitchell (1913) , Fisher (1933) , Minsky (1977) and Kindleberger (1978) ; for a review, see Fratianni (2008) . Other characteristics, instead, are unique to this crisis, such as the transfer of assets from the balance sheets of banks to the markets, the creation of complex and opaque assets, the failure of ratings agencies to properly assess the risk of such assets, and the application of fair value accounting. The "originate-to-distribute" bank model lowered the incentive of the originator to screen debtors whose loans were to be placed off balance sheet.
While reputational considerations would suggest that the originator might not want to compromise its standards, the fact that regulators and accounting standards required little disclosure about unconsolidated off-balance sheet entities made these entities opaque to investors and lowered the cost of reputational loss to the sponsoring institution. To complicate matters, the ratings agencies were not up to the task of properly evaluating the new complex products (Calomiris 2007) . In fact, there is evidence that credit standards deteriorated in the United States during the 2001-2007 credit boom, especially in the subprime mortgage market (Demyanyk and van Hembert 2009; Dell'Ariccia et al. 2008 ). Another problem with the "originate-to-distribute" model stems from the contingency that the off-balance sheet entities could be reabsorbed by the sponsoring institution to either cover large trading losses or prevent a downgrade of the sponsored institution's credit risk (IMF 2008a, Box 2.6) .
At that point, there would be a reversal of the intended benefits of the "originate-to-distribute" model: risk would return home and regulatory capital would rise. The investor, having finally gained transparency in the transaction, would judge correctly that the sponsoring bank was overleveraged and would demand a higher return on capital; this, in turn, would translate into a spot drop of the share price of the consolidated bank.
Governments have intervened massively and repeatedly to support banks during the crisis. We examine the effectiveness of these interventions by measuring the markets' reaction to intervention announcements. To do so, we create an original dataset of public interventions that distinguishes announcements directed at the banking system as a whole (general announcements) from those directed at specific banks (specific announcements). With this dataset, we apply event-study methodology to estimate the value of government interventions to support banks and their shareholders. The maintained hypothesis is that the announcement of a rescue plan is credible if it affects rates of return of the targeted banks. We test for these effects by computing cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of the participating banks around a window that includes announcement dates. We perform four separate tests on our sample of large banks. One test estimates, with panel data, the overall impact on banks' equity value of the two types of government rescue announcements; a second estimates cross-area spillover effects of general announcements; a third estimates cross-bank spillover effects of specific announcements using US banks; and a fourth considers the impact of multiple specific announcements.
Our findings show that general and specific announcements are priced by the markets as CAR over the selected window periods. General announcements tend to be associated with positive CAR and specific announcements with negative ones. Foreign general announcements exert cross-area spillovers, but are perceived by home-country banks as boosting the competitive advantage of foreign banks. Specific announcements exert spillovers on other banks. Our results are also sensitive to the information environment. Specific announcements tend to exert a positive impact on rates of return before the crisis erupts, when announcements are few and markets have relative confidence in the "normal" information flow. The opposite takes place when the crisis explodes, announcements are the order of the day and markets mistrust the information flow. These results appear consistent with the observed reluctance of individual institutions to seek public assistance. Bank size is priced positively by the markets, but there is no clear evidence of too-big-to-fail policy. Specific announcements exacerbate moral hazard of subsided banks and make the banking system more fragile to negative shocks and less sensitive to further injections of public funds.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the market reaction to the crisis and shows that Lehman Brothers' failure was a critical event. Section 3 reviews event-study methodology with a focus on the event-parameter application within a regression framework. Section 4 describes our testable models. Section 5 reviews the long list of government announcements to rescue banks and discusses our dataset. We show that governments have employed a mixture of capital injections and bank asset and debt guarantees, and that opaque but politically attractive guarantees have been dominant. Section 6 employs event-study methodology to estimate the impact of government interventions on banks and their shareholders. Conclusions are drawn in the last section.
MARKETS' REACTION TO LIQUIDITY RUSH AND RISK REPRICING
The first effect of the crisis on the market was a rush for liquidity due to risk repricing of assets. The liquidity crisis exploded in the interbank market in August of 2007. Figure 1 [Insert Figure 1 here]
The markets were gripped by fears of credit and liquidity risks, two risks distinguishable in theory, but not in practice (IMF 2008b, pp. 78-81 To illustrate, according to reported accounting data, the US banking system did not appear severely undercapitalized: at the end of 2008, the ratio of Tier 1 or core capital to risk-weighted assets was 17.4 percent for small banks, 12.3 percent for intermediate banks, and 9.4 percent for large banks. These ratios are way above the benchmark of 4 percent. Yet, it was The shrinking of balance sheets and the re-pricing of risk across a variety of assets triggered a process of deleveraging, as predicted by the credit-boom-and-bust hypothesis. From the second half of 2007 through September 2008, deleveraging of global banks was met with $430 billion of fresh capital (IMF 2008b, p. 22) . Then, with recapitalization becoming increasingly difficult, deleverage was achieved by selling assets in illiquid markets. Thus, without significant profits to retire debt or fresh capital to finance it, the deleveraging process necessarily implied distress sales and falling asset values Stock market data show the extent of the financial maelstrom. We collect equity prices for a sample of banks from three areas of the world: the United States, Western Europe, and the Pacific region. The actual list, shown in the Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, an event widely believed to be a watershed in the crisis; March 9, 2009 was selected because is the date when the market finally bottomed out.
widely acknowledged that banks were severely undercapitalized. Undercapitalization has been the biggest stumbling block to the resolution of the financial crisis. 4 Only the largest listed banks are included. For Ireland, Norway, and Switzerland, we have one bank each.
[Insert 
METHODOLOGY
The rescue of several large financial institutions in the United States and in Europe was sparked by the migration of liquidity risk from banks to other financial institutions and followed the rapidly expanding role of government as a market maker of last resort to support not only big banking, but also big finance. We employ event-study methodology to estimate markets' reaction to the announcements of government interventions.
Event-study methodology goes back to the 1930s (Dolley 1933), but became ubiquitous in capital markets research after important contributions by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969) . 5 The spreading popularity of this technique, however, was accompanied by modifications of the original setup that implied violations of the underlying statistical assumptions (MacKinlay 1997).
Corrections and practical adjustments to these practices surfaced in the second half of 1970s; for a review, see Serra (2002) (1990) . The second is an event-parameter approach, in which the valuation model is estimated over the combined estimation and event periods, and includes dummy variables defined (to be equal to one) over a relevant event window; for an example, see Meulbroek (1992) .
The two approaches are unbiased and equivalent under the assumption of serially independent and normally distributed returns and non-overlapping event windows (Corrado 2009). Conversely, problems arise in the presence of overlapping windows, multiple events, aggregation of abnormal returns across firms, cross-sectional dependence, serial correlation, event-induced volatility and eventinduced returns (De Jong 2007) . A number of these statistical problems can be overcome with the event-parameter regression framework (Binder 1998). In our case, general announcements are clearly overlapping because they influence all banks in a country; furthermore, if different countries were to coordinate their policies overlapping would be exacerbated. Also, public interventions become multiple events when the same bank receives subsidies repeatedly during the crisis. In the presence of overlapping multiple events, Binder (1998) suggests the use of event-parameter methodology because it simplifies the estimation and is more flexible in hypothesis testing. This methodology provides also a natural solution to aggregation problems across banks. Other considerations as well support the choice of the event-parameter framework: with relatively frequent events, as it is true in our case, information on multiple events is lost or distorted by the two-step approach because the estimation window is either too short or affected by previous announcements. The event-parameter methodology is relatively more efficient because abnormal returns are estimated in one step. 
TESTABLE MODELS
We propose four separate tests using the event-parameter methodology. The first aims at uncovering the overall impact on banks' equity value of general and specific announcements; the second at identifying the cross-area spillover effects of general announcements; the third at unveiling the crossbank spillover effects of specific announcements; and the last test focuses on multiple specific announcements.
In the first test, daily rates of returns on bank stock i of country j at time t, R ijt , are regressed on an intercept, capturing the risk-free rate of return and on the market rate of return, R M jt , and two dummy event variables. The first dummy variable, G jt , is equal to one during the event time window, T, around a general announcement; otherwise it is zero. The second dummy variable, S it , is equal to one in the time window T around a specific announcement. We also break down G and S by different intervention types, such as capital injections and asset and debt guarantees. The test is formalized as follows:
where u denotes a well-behaved error term and G and S become dummy vectors when we disaggregate by intervention type.
7 Markets' reactions to announcements are captured by γ and δ: returns within the time window T are predicted to be higher than returns in other periods; that is, the government-6 Furthermore we employ robust standard errors and cluster correction to reduce problems of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. 7 In this case, the extended formulation is:
where CAP and GUA indicate, respectively, capital injection and asset and debt guarantees. intervention event generates CAR. Since the error of the regression must be zero on average, the null hypothesis is that CAR, within T, must also be zero. A rejection of the null hypothesis corroborates the presence of abnormal returns. In (1), CAR is the sum of the estimates of parameters γ and δ multiplied by T (Meulbroek 1992 ).
The second test uses bank data from each of the three areas, as in (2) 
There are two differences with respect to equation (1). The first is that coefficients are now denoted with a subscript "j" to indicate that they are area specific. The second is that (2) adds three cross-area general announcement dummies, XAG k,j , where k is the area broadcasting G and j another area receiving the potential impact of G: for example, XAG 3,1 captures the G effect of area 3 (say, Pacific) on area 1 (say, US). Cross effects can also occur among countries located in the same area (for example Australia impacting Japan). Such within-area cross effects are denoted by XAG j,j . 8 In (2), CAR is equal to the estimate of θ k,j times T.
The third test focuses on cross-bank spillover effects of specific announcements, S. The motivation for this experiment is that during a crisis markets are shrouded in a fog of ignorance about the true extent of banks' difficulties. The news that one large bank will be receiving government support sends two separate signals. One signal is that if government saves a large bank, it is also likely to save another large bank (too-big-to-fail effect); the other signal is that government will have fewer resources to deploy for other large banks (resource crowding-out effect). The Lehman's failure shook the markets exactly because it was a glaring exception to the too-big-to-fail principle. 9 Given the limitations of our data, we restrict the test to US banks (k=1).
We perform the test in two alternative ways. In the first version, we group US banks in tertiles to estimate effects of cross-group specific announcements, XGS j,i .
where subscript j was dropped because all i banks are located in the same country and subscript g is added for tertiles. XGS tz,g indicates cross-specific announcements of bank group z on group g, except for those of bank i. Coefficient γ g captures the effect of US general announcements, δ g the effect of specific announcements for the i th bank, θ k,g the effect of cross-general announcements from Europe and the Pacific area, and λ z,g the effect of specific announcements from bank group z on the g th group, except those of bank i.
In the second version, we test the too-big-too-fail policy among the largest US banks. 
where XBS h,i indicates the cross-specific announcement of bank h on bank i. Note that the own specific announcement S is equal to the cross-specific announcement XBS when i=h. Coefficients are the same of equation (3a), except for λ h≠i that captures the effect of a specific announcement of the h th bank (say, Citigroup, J.P. Morgan, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, American Express, and Morgan Stanley) on the i th bank (say, Bank of America).
In the final test, we focus on the effects of multiple specific announcements. One reason why such announcements are repeated may stem from the incomplete nature of the information available to 9 For evidence of the too-big-to-fail principle, see O'Hara and Shaw (1990) .
governments. Banks tend to hide their financial difficulties to avoid the cost of higher risk premium on own debt and equity. Furthermore, the granting of the subsidy can induce the targeted bank to either be more prudent or more opportunistic (moral hazard), depending on whether the government makes the subsidy conditional on tough requirements and strict monitoring or not. If requirements are perceived excessive, the targeted bank may decide to forego the subsidy. We test bank behavior with equation (4):
where c is the number of specific announcements received by the i th bank. We do not consider c>2 Table A1 of the Appendix; Bloomberg is the source of the data. We also collected announcement dates of government rescue plans over the same period. As mentioned, we classify two types of rescueannouncement events: G, whereby the government declares its intention to protect the entire national banking system, and S aimed at saving specific banks; see Tables A2 and A3, Portugal. Clearly, differences in the committed amounts cannot be explained only by differences in national sizes of financial markets.
Commitments to specific interventions, over the same period, amount to $2.4 trillion, of which 39.9 percent as capital injections and 60.1 percent as asset and debt guarantees (Appendix, Table A3 ).
The ranking of subsidy-receiving banks changes according to the type of intervention. Considering all subsidies, the Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds TBS top the list, respectively with $529 and $408 billion, followed by Citigroup and Hypo Real Estate with $330 billion each, Dexia with $228 billion and Bank of America with $144 billion.
In sum, governments have used a mix of general and specific interventions, reflecting the opaqueness of information after Lehman's failure. Asset and debt guaranties are politically attractive because governments do not have to argue the case with legislators. They also entail smaller current costs than the expected present-value contingent cost, suggesting that governments are prone to gamble for a possible resurrection of the banking system. This strategy was a defining characteristic of both the US Savings and Loans crisis of the Eighties and the long Japanese crisis of the Nineties, which was responsible for transforming "a relatively small cost into a staggeringly large one" (Glauber 2000, p.
102). an increase in the between cross-sectional variability. The main message is that the financial crisis enlarged size differences among banks.
[Insert Table 2 , here]
FINDINGS
The hypothesis underlying our analysis is that the announcement of a rescue plan is credible if it raises the survivability and rates of return of participating banks. Therefore, we can test the effects of rescue plans by computing CAR of participating banks around an announcement-date window. Estimates of alpha, the risk free rate, and beta, the market risk parameter, from the capital asset price model are estimated on daily returns for the PRE and POST periods. A general announcement is more complex than a specific announcement because it requires longer time for the market to process it; in addition, it is easier for the markets to obtain relevant information about general than specific announcements. For this reason, we apply different windows to the two types of announcements: a seven-day window for general announcements centered on the announcement date and spanning three working days before and after the announcement, and a five-day window for specific announcements centered on the announcement date and spanning two working days before and after the announcement. We exclude UK banks from the estimation because UK capital injections were in fact nationalizations that tend to be unfavorable to private shareholders and can distort market reactions. 11 Consequently, the number of banks in our sample is reduced to 116.
Overall impact of general and specific announcements on banks' rates of return
The first test estimates the overall impact of 49 general and 133 specific announcements on banks' returns using the entire panel of 116 banks. 12 Results for the two periods are shown in In addition to the variables indicated on the right-hand side of equation (1) The first key finding of Table 3 is that all announcements have a statistically significant and economically relevant impact on banks' rates of return. 14 The PRE period has no general announcements G and relatively few specific announcements S, which produce a CAR of 8.8
percentage points. In the POST period, G-induced CAR are almost 5 percentage points higher than normal returns while S-induced CAR are 1.7 percentage points lower than normal returns. The opposite signs of the G and S coefficients reflect differences in the way markets evaluate the two types of announcements. A general announcement is taken as a signal that government wants to protect the Table 3 , except for the last column, the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients from the fixed effect model is not systematically different from the coefficients of the random effect model is rejected at the significance level of 5%. In this case, that is under the alternative hypothesis, the random-effect model is inconsistent, where the fixed-effect model is. In the last column, observations decrease and the null hypothesis is rejected at the significance level of 10%. 14 WALD tests of null announcement effects are rejected in all specifications at 5 percent level, except for first period (column 1) rejected at 10 percent level.
banking systems. The banking industry, as a whole, receives support and shareholders gain "abnormally" high rates of return over the announcement window. A specific announcement, instead, generates a more problematic signal. During "normal" times, when markets face stable information flows and are able to price banks' future net cash flows with relative efficiency, S is evaluated as a boost to shareholders' return. On the other hand, in the fog of a financial crisis, when markets are extremely uncertain about the quality of the assets, a specific announcement is taken as a revelation of partially unknown troubles. S-induced CAR, therefore, may turn out to be negative. On this point, it is worth recalling that particularly hectic activities took place in the first half of October 2008, when governments intervened on a big scale to stabilize their banking systems; see Figure 2 . Over a threeweek period, policy makers first decided to guarantee or purchase assets (GUA), then to inject fresh capital into banks (CAP), and finally to guarantee bank debts (GUA). The speed with which new strategies were introduced underscores the state of confusion, if not outright panic, enshrouding government decisions. Capital markets were extremely opaque in the immediate wake of Lehman's failure.
Differences in the information environment appear to be corroborated by CAR patterns in the two periods: specific announcements have a positive impact on R i in PRE, when announcements were few and markets had relative confidence in the "normal" information flow (column 1); but negative in the turbulent POST when announcements were the order of the day and markets mistrusted the information flow (column 2). These results appear consistent with the observed reluctance of individual institutions to ask for public assistance. The fear of being identified as a "bad apple" was also the reason why some banks were reticent to seek emergency lending from central banks.
In column 3, the base model is expanded with interactive terms between market returns and the two announcement dummies, so as to capture abnormal betas. We find a negative (positive) abnormal market risk for general (specific) announcements, a pattern that corroborates the earlier result that general announcements provide a safety net to banking system whereas specific announcements appear to identify "bad apple" banks. We also check, in column 4, for potential too-big-too-fail effect by adding interactive terms between SIZEREL and announcement dummies; we find no evidence of that.
The second key finding of Table 3 is that markets have had difficulties in sorting out the relative efficacy of different types of announcements. Column 5 reports the estimate of the base model and columns 6 through 9 the estimates of the expanded model. Both G CAP and G GUA exert a positive impact on R i . On the other hand, the negative impact of S on R i is driven wholly by S CAP . Area regressions confirm this pattern. In column 6, abnormal betas are estimated by intervention types:
general announcements of asset and debt guarantees lower beta, whereas general announcements of capital injections and the two types of specific announcements raise beta. Columns 7 through 9 underscore differences of abnormal market risk in the three areas. In particular, the US market stands out as somewhat different with respect to other areas.
[Insert Table 3 [Insert Figure 3 , here]
5.2 Cross-area spillover effects of general announcements [Insert Table 4 , here]
5.3 Cross-bank spillover effects of specific announcements Next, we test the cross-bank spillover effects induced by specific announcements. Given the limitations of our data and the particular role of the US financial market, we restrict the test to the 45 US banks in our sample, which are divided in tertiles based on their PRE market capitalization. Also, the data do not permit the use of interactive terms for cross-area and cross-group spillovers. Table 5 shows the estimates of equation (3a). Cross-group effects are negative, suggesting a resource crowding-out phenomenon and the absence of a too-big-to-fail policy: when the government saves a bank, the market fears that the government will curtail subsidies to other banks.
[Insert Table 5 here]
We probe further into the too-big-to-fail issue by focusing on the largest banks; see Table 6 . We select the top seven US banks by market capitalization as of June 30, 2008: Bank of America, JPMorgan, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and American Express, which account for more than 60 percent of US bank market capitalization, 100 percent of asset and debt guarantees, and 90 percent of capital injections. 17 The estimation is performed with OLS and robust standard errors.
SIZEREL is no longer necessary without the cross-sectional dimension and it is eliminated.
Recall that while a specific announcement may signal unexpected financial difficulties of the targeted institution and inter-bank competition for subsidies, it may also signal the intention of government to save another bank at least as big as the one it just saved. [Insert Table 6 , here]
Multiple specific announcements
Our last test relates to impact on bank returns of multiple specific announcements (CUM). Table 7 reports the estimation of equation (4) after eliminating the dummy S because it is already included in CUM. We report on the selection of bank fixed vs. random effect models using the Hausman test.
There are two sections in the table: one on the left relates to banks with at least one single specific announcement (CUM1 dummy variable) and the other on the right relates to banks with multiple specific announcements broken down by number of interventions (CUM1 and CUM2 dummy variables). 18 Concerning the former, three important findings emerge. The first is that beta rises when a bank receives a subsidy, suggesting a higher degree of moral hazard or a more fragile banking system.
The second is that the benefit of a general announcement declines for banks targeted by a specific 18 CUM1 is equal to one 1 when bank i receives only one specific announcement and zero otherwise, whereas CUM2 is equal to one when bank i receives at least two specific announcements and zero otherwise.
announcement, whose CAR falls by 7.5 percentage points in the United States and 7.2 points in Europe. Furthermore, the interaction of G with CUM1 fails to reduce market risk of targeted banks.
The third is that bank size becomes more important for multi-intervention banks in smaller European markets than in the larger US market. This could be interpreted as markets anticipating different reactions by authorities to bank size: too-big-to-fail policy may be more relevant for small than large countries because banks from small countries need to be larger in relation to domestic market size than banks from big countries to compete in global markets. The right panel of Table 7 extends the model to distinguish between the effects of single-S (CUM1) and multi-S banks (CUM2). The key finding here is that US multi-S banks face a higher market risk, whereas their European counterparts are penalized by negative G-induced CAR. 19 On the other hand, abnormal betas increase with the number of public interventions in the United Staates, but not in Europe.
In sum, the findings of Table 7 suggest that the soft budget constraint implied by government subsidies reduces the efficacy of repeated rescue announcements and induces a more opportunistic behavior in targeted banks. Differences between areas affect marginally this result. The diminishing benefits from government interventions have the policy implication that subsidies are only an urgent and temporary crisis measures and should be quickly replaced by structural reforms.
[Insert Table 7 , here]
CONCLUSIONS
The great financial crisis of 2007-2009 had its roots in a credit boom that manifested itself in an extremely indebted US economy. Subprime defaults spread the fire in a financial system that had become fragile as a result of several factors unique to this crisis. Banks' undercapitalization explains the persistence of the crisis and why governments have injected vast sums of public funds into banks.
Our paper focuses on the specific question of whether general and specific rescue announcements were priced by the markets as cumulative abnormal returns over selected event windows. General announcements tend to be associated with positive abnormal returns (and lower market risk) and specific announcements with negative abnormal returns (and higher market risk);
foreign general announcements exert cross-area spillovers, but are perceived by the home-country banks as subsidies boosting the competitive advantage of foreign banks; specific announcements exert a resource crowding-out effect on other banks; and multiple specific announcements increase the degree of moral hazard of subsidized banks. Our results are also sensitive to the information environment. Specific announcements tend to exert a positive impact on rates of return in the preLehman failure period, when announcements were few and markets trusted the "normal" information flow. The opposite occurred in the turbulent phase of the crisis when announcements were frequent and markets mistrusted the information flow. These results appear consistent with the observed reluctance of individual institutions to request public assistance. The fear of being identified as a "bad apple" was also the reason why some banks were reticent to apply at central banks for emergency lending.
Three other generalizations emerge from our evidence. The first is that market reaction to rescue announcements is not uniform across areas. In particular, capital injections in the United States, the country where the crisis originated and the world's financial leader, exert effects on bank returns that are different from those in other countries. The second is that markets appear to have valued timely and big actions without much regard to refinements as to the type of actions undertaken. The different long-run consequences of different types of interventions were ignored. As it is true in a war, participants in a financial crisis want to survive: planning horizons are shortened and considerations that are taken seriously under normal circumstances are instead relegated in the background. This pattern is consistent with the lessons from the last Nordic and Japanese banking crises: timely and big public interventions solved successfully the crisis in Sweden, whereas untimely and small government measures led to the lost Japanese decade. It is also consistent with the diminishing benefits from government interventions that reinforce markets' perceptions that subsidies are urgent and temporary
anti-crisis measures and should be quickly replaced by structural reforms. The third is that, given that different announcements produce similar effects, governments might have had incentives to gamble for opaque and "low-cost" guarantees of bank assets and debts rather than undertake more transparent and costly alternatives.
Government rescue plans are likely to lead to a consolidation of the banking system. This, in turn, raises the probability of invoking the too-big-to-fail policy. We find that bank size matters even if there is not a clear evidence for the too-big-to-fail policy. In one test dealing with cross-bank spillovers using the largest US banks, our findings are consistent with a mix of resource crowding-out and toobig-to-fail policy. Clues about the latter also emerge from multiple-event regressions by area. The XAG x = cross-area general announcement from x. XBS X TH group = cross-group specific announcement from x th group. XBS on itself excludes bank i's announcements. CAR = cumulative abnormal returns with 5-day windows. All estimations include bank fixed effects; UK banks excluded. WALD vs null cross-group specific announcement effects; Hausman Test vs random effects. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.10 # p<0.15. NOTES: POST = 15/09/2008 to 31/12/2009; Rm = daily rate of return of the national stock exchange where bank i is located; G (S) = general (specific) announcement dummy; ALL = all announcement types (capital injections and asset and debt guarantees). XAG x = cross-area general announcement from area x. XBS x = cross-bank specific announcement from x th bank. CAR = cumulative abnormal returns with 5 day windows. All estimations with OLS and robust standard errors. WALD vs null cross-bank specific announcement effects. Banks ranked according to market capitalization on June 30, 2008. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.10 # p<0.15. In Model 1, CUM1 = 1 when bank i has received at least 1 specific announcements, 0 otherwise. In Model 2, CUM1 = 1 when bank i has received only 1 specific announcements, 0 otherwise; CUM2 = 1 when bank i has received at least 2 specific announcements; 0 otherwise. CAR = cumulative abnormal returns with 5 day windows. All estimations include bank specific effects but fixed or random effects are reported according to the Hausman Test; UK banks excluded. WALD vs null cumulative specific announcement effects. No specific announcements in the Pacific area (not reported). *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.10 # p<0.15. 
